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Tax Treaty Classification of Netherlands-
Source Income from Lucrative Interests 
(Carried Interest)
This article discusses the tax treaty classification 
of Netherlands-source carried interest (income 
from lucrative interests) earned by non-
resident taxpayers. The Netherlands legislator 
has created a specific regime to tax this type 
of remuneration in order to discourage the 
granting of such benefits. However, the article 
establishes that the effectiveness of this regime 
may be restricted by Netherlands tax treaties 
and the Netherlands tax liability of non-
residents.
1.  Introduction
The Law on Taxation of Excessive Remuneration (Belas-
tingheffing excessieve beloningsbestanddelen) entered into 
force on 1 January 2009. This law consists of a number 
of tax amendments to the Wages Tax Act 1964 (Wet op 
de loonbelasting 1964, WTA) and Income Tax Act 2001 
(Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001, ITA 2001) that are aimed 
at taxing the top salaries of, amongst others, directors 
and private equity fund managers. The two measures dis-
cussed in this article are as follows:
(1) a quasi-final tax (quasi-payroll tax) that is levied 
in the form of an employers’ tax of 30% on sever-
ance payments (“golden handshakes”) to the extent 
such severance payments are higher than the annual 
salary; this tax is levied on salaries of EUR 522,000 or 
greater (2011 amount);1
(2) the taxation of income from capital (such as shares 
and debt claims) in Box I, subject to progressive 
tax rates, as income from other activities, provided 
these items represent remuneration for work of the 
recipient that is subject to special conditions that 
give the item the character of a lucrative interest 
(carried interest), for example, if a “leveraging” effect 
exists with respect to the shares.2
This provision has been described as a “greed tax” 
(graaitax)3 and has also been referred to as “symbolic 
legislation” and “botched legislation”.4 The regulation 
on lucrative interest (carried interest) represents a fun-
damental revision of the income tax system. The measure 
regarding excessive severance payments is, essentially, an 
extension of the quasi-final tax regime under the WTA.5
The legislator, by taxing income from lucrative interests 
(carried interest) under the category of “income from 
other activities” (Art. 3.92b ITA 2001) is targeting, in par-
ticular, what it considers to be excessive income earned, 
for example, by private equity fund managers or manag-
ing partners. Such persons are given the opportunity to 
invest their remuneration for their work in shares, debt 
claims and certain other property subject to special con-
ditions that result in potential returns that are out of pro-
portion with the capital invested and thereby can be con-
sidered excessive.
Many questions arise in regard to the tax treaty classi-
fication of lucrative interests derived in a cross-border 
situation (where the assumption is that the income will 
be taxed under domestic law as income from other activi-
ties and any possible taxation as wages has been settled):
– Under which article of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (OECD Model) should the income 
from a lucrative interest be classified?
– To what extent is the meaning given to “income from 
lucrative interests” under domestic law decisive in 
regard to a tax treaty under Art. 3(2) of the OECD 
Model or does the context here require a different 
meaning?
These aspects are, amongst others, elaborated on in this 
article. The discussion in the article is limited to non-
resident taxpayers (Section 3.). Section 2. gives a short 
overview of the system of ITA 2001 in relation to income 
from lucrative interests. Section 4. contains some conclu-
sions that can be drawn from the parliamentary debate 
regarding the tax treaty aspects of income from lucrative 
interests. Section 5. provides an analysis of the tax treaty 
classification of income from lucrative interests. Section 
6. outlines the tax treaty classification of these types of 
income that the author prefers. Section 7. provides some 
conclusions.
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1. Art. 32bb WTA.
2. Art. 3.92b ITA 2001.
3. A.J. van Soelen and A.C. Hendriks, “Graaitax verdient betere codifica-
tie”, Fiscaal Tijdschrift Vermogen 10 (2008), p. 5 et seq.
4. During the discussion of the draft law in the First Chamber, Senator 
Biermans used these terms. See Eerste Kamer, Handelingen, 9 December 
2008, pp. 13-595, right column.
5. Until 1 January 2009 this kind of quasi-final taxation was only applied 
with respect to early retirement (Art. 32aa WTA), and only in fairly 
exceptional situations. For situations in which pension rights in excess 
of EUR 522,000 (on the basis of a final pay system) have accumulated, 
Art. 32bc of the WTA contains a quasi-final tax at a rate of 15% on a 
notionally calculated back service (this measure, however, entered into 
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2.  The System of ITA 2001 in Relation to Income 
from Lucrative Interests
It should be kept in mind that the regime covering 
income from other activities only comes into play when 
the income has left the sphere of wages (Sec. 3.3 ITA 
2001 and Art. 3.80-3.87 ITA 2001).6 This follows from the 
order of sources under Art. 2.14(1) of the ITA 2001. The 
tax base on which the wage tax is levied forms a part of the 
opening value of the lucrative interest:7 on the opening 
balance sheet for the determination of income from 
other activities the relevant property titles are booked 
at the historic cost price plus the amount that was paid 
as wages.8 The quasi-profits regime of Art. 3.94 and Art. 
3.95 of the ITA 2001 is then applicable to the income 
from the lucrative interests.9
3.  Non-Resident Tax Liability
For a non-resident taxpayer, the benefit from a lucra-
tive interest forms part of his Netherlands income if that 
income is partially intended as remuneration for activi-
ties carried out in the Netherlands (Art. 21(1)(b) and (2) 
in conjunction with Art. 7.2(2)(c) and (3) ITA 2001). For 
a resident taxpayer, a benefit from a lucrative interest that 
is related to work that took place outside the Netherlands 
forms part of his worldwide income (Art. 2(1)(a) in con-
junction with Art. 3.92b ITA 2001). One problem with 
this is that the Double Taxation Avoidance Decree 2001 
does not mention the category “taxable income from 
other activities” and, therefore, in certain circumstances, 
no relief from double taxation will be available.10 These 
differences between the Decree and non-resident tax li-
ability are out of kilter.11
In Art. 7.2(3) of the ITA 2001 the term “work activities in 
the Netherlands” is so broad that it includes, “the holding 
of shares, debt claims or rights within the meaning of 
Art. 3.92b or having debts within the meaning of Art. 
3.92b if the benefits arising therefrom may be consid-
ered to be aimed partially at remunerating work activi-
ties carried out in the Netherlands”. As a result of the 
wording of the phrase “to be aimed partially at remuner-
ating”, if at least one of the reasons for granting a lucrative 
interest is to remunerate the taxpayer for employment in 
the Netherlands, all the benefits from this interest in the 
Netherlands are taxable under national legislation.12 The 
Netherlands has, in this respect, excessively extended its 
taxing jurisdiction. It would have been more logical to 
restrict the benefits subject to non-resident tax liability 
to those benefits that can be allocated to work activi-
ties in the Netherlands on the basis of proportionality, 
in other words, in proportion to the work activities that 
were actually carried out in the Netherlands.13
A requirement for non-resident tax liability in regard to 
income from a lucrative interest is that the work activi-
ties connected to the lucrative interest have to be carried 
out in the Netherlands. The seat of the company in which 
the lucrative interest is held or that has granted the lucra-
tive interest is not a relevant criterion in applying Art. 
7.2(3), in conjunction with Art. 7.2(2)(c), of the ITA 
2001.14 Under the right of option in Art. 3.95b(5) of the 
ITA 2001, where the lucrative interest is indirectly held 
through a holding company, the taxpayer is granted the 
option to be taxed only once in Box II (taxable income 
from a substantial shareholding taxed at a rate of 25%). 
The condition for this is that, in the relevant calendar 
year, at least 95% of the income derived from the lucrative 
interest is redistributed by the holding company to the 
individual taxpayer. During the parliamentary debates it 
was pointed out that the option available in Art. 3.95b(5) 
of the ITA 2001 is also available for a non-resident tax-
payer who holds an indirect lucrative interest via a per-
sonal holding company resident abroad if at least 95% 
of the benefits from the lucrative interest is immediately 
paid out by the personal holding company to the share-
holder.15 This remark probably stems from EU law con-
siderations,16 but it does mean that, through such a struc-
ture, it is possible to avoid non-resident tax liability.
4.  Some Conclusions as Regards the 
Parliamentary Debate 
The application of tax treaties to lucrative interests, as 
described in the parliamentary debate, can be summa-
rized as follows. It should be noted that these conclusions 
are largely based on deduction, that there are inconsisten-
cies and that it is not entirely clear what method of treaty 
interpretation was being followed:
– The starting point is that income from lucrative 
interests should be classified under Arts. 15 (income 
from employment) or 16 (directors’ fees) of the 
6. Explanatory Memorandum (MvT), Kamerstukken II, 2007/08, 31 459, 
No. 3, pp. 8 and 17, as well as Explanatory Memorandum (MvA), Ka-
merstukken I, 2007/08, 31 459, No. C, p. 10. 
7. Explanatory Memorandum (MvT), Kamerstukken II, 2007/08, 31 459, 
No. 3, p. 8 and MvA, Kamerstukken I, 2007/08, 31 459, No. C, p. 10.
8. Further Additional Report (NNV), Kamerstukken II, 2007/08, 31 459, 
No. 9, p. 19.
9. Explanatory Memorandum (MvA), Kamerstukken I, 2007/08, 31 459, 
No. C, p. 11.
10. Tax treaties concluded after 1980 refer to the method of calculating 
double taxation relief contained in the Double Taxation Avoidance 
Decree 2001. 
11. J.A. Booij, “De Wet Inkomstenbelasting 2001 en de toepassing van 
belastingverdragen”, in A.C. Rijkers and H. Vording (eds.), Vijf jaar 
Wet IB 2001 (Deventer: Kluwer, 2006), p. 239. For more details on this 
situation reference is made to E. Nijkeuter, “Of een koe een haas vangt: 
over lucratieve belangen in grensoverschrijdende situaties”, Weekblad 
fiscaal recht 6809 (2009), p. 490 et seq., section 7.
12. The fact that the entire benefit is taken into account under the 
non-resident tax liability was confirmed by the State Secretary in 
Explanatory Memorandum (MvA), Kamerstukken I, 2008/09, 31 459, 
No. C, p. 18.
13. See also J. Doornebal, “Zeven redenen waarom het lucratief belangre-
gime het Staatsblad niet had mogen bereiken”, Nederlands Tijdschrift 
voor Fiscaal Recht 402 (2009), p. 3.
14. Nijkeuter, note 11, p. 490 and Nijkeuter, Belastingheffing van dividend en 
de interne markt (Amersfoort: SDU Uitgevers, 2010), p. 167.
15. Explanatory Memorandum (MvA), Kamerstukken I, 2007/08, 31 459, 
No. C, p. 19.
16. Compare ECJ, 18 November 1999, Case C-200/98, X AB and Y AB v. 
Riksskatteverket; 13 April 2000, Case C-251/98, C. Baars v. Inspecteur 
der Belastingen Particulieren/ondernemingen Gorinchem; 6 June 2000, 
Case C-35/98, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen; and 3 
October 2006, Case C-290/04, FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH 
v Finanzamt Hamburg-Eimsbüttel.
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OECD Model because of the presumed link with 
employment;17
– The classification under Arts. 15 or 16 of the OECD 
Model holds as long as appreciation or capital 
gains are at issue. Therefore, from the Netherlands 
perspective, there does not appear to be room for 
Art. 13 of the OECD Model (capital gains);18 it is 
less clear what the treaty classification will be if a 
dividend is paid on the lucrative interest. On the 
one hand, the State Secretary argues that such a 
payment falls under Art. 10 of the OECD Model 
(dividends)19 and, on the other hand, he is of the 
opinion that a payment by a non-transparent (in 
the Netherlands view) US limited partnership to a 
Netherlands resident falls under Art. 16 (income 
from employment) or Art. 17 (directors’ fees) of the 
Netherlands-US tax treaty (1992) (in his answer, 
however, the State Secretary makes generaliza-
tions on the basis of the specific case and puts the 
discussion in a more general framework).20
5.  A Further Analysis of the Tax Treaty 
Classification of Benefits from a Lucrative 
Interest
5.1.  Art. 3(2) OECD Model 
The question arises whether the benefits from a lucrative 
interest have to be classified primarily under Art. 15 of 
the OECD Model as income from employment or under 
Art. 16 of the OECD Model as directors’ fees (see also 4.). 
Whether Art. 15 (income from employment) or Art. 16 of 
the OECD Model (directors’ fees) is applicable depends 
on the interpretation of the concepts of “salaries, wages 
and other similar remuneration” and “directors’ fees and 
other similar payments”. These concepts are not defined 
in the treaty and, thus, must be interpreted in accordance 
with Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model, which refers to the 
applicability of the domestic law of the contracting states 
to the treaty in question unless the context otherwise 
requires. The reference to domestic law was upheld by 
the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) in its deci-
sions of 5 September 2003 (fictitious wages).21 Art. 3(2) 
of the OECD Model does not require that reference be 
made to domestic law only when the concepts are identi-
cal. What is decisive is whether or not the domestic law 
uses a similar concept that, at least according to the Neth-
erlands Supreme Court, is also used in a similar context as 
that under the applicable tax treaty.22 Hence, the concept 
“salaries, wages and other similar remuneration”, as a 
matter of principle, must be given the meaning that is 
given to the concept of “wages” under Art. 10(1) of the 
WTA and Art. 3.81 of the ITA 2001. This was also upheld 
by the Netherlands Supreme Court in its decision of 10 
February 1999 (with regard to a severance payment).23 
The same is, mutatis mutandis, applicable in regard to 
directors’ fees. The context will only require a meaning 
that deviates in exceptional circumstances; examples of 
this include, at least from a Netherlands tax law perspec-
tive, the classification of public disability allowances24 
under tax treaties that do not contain a specific provi-
sion on social security allowances25 and the classification 
of wages as fictitious (Art. 12a WTA) under tax treaties 
17. Further Additional Report (NNV), Kamerstukken II, 2007/08, 31 459, 
No. 9, p. 23 and plenary session of 3 September 2008, Belastingheffing 
excessieve beloningsbestanddelen, 31 459, TK 107, 7875. The State Sec-
retary based his conclusion, i.e. that Arts. 15 or Art. 16 of the OECD 
Model are applicable to benefits from a lucrative interest, on the fact that 
the remuneration is connected to [work] activities (the State Secretary 
repeated this view in answer to the question raised by the Netherlands 
Order of Tax Consultants/Nederlandse Orde van Belastingadviseurs as a 
result of the Memorandum on the Netherlands Tax Treaty Policy that 
was published by the Ministry of Finance on 11 February 2011; compare 
annex 1 of the letter of the State Secretary of Finance of 24 June 2011 
to the Chairman of the Second Chamber of the States-General, p. 16). 
This also represents, at least if the author understands him correctly, a 
sufficient connection with the employment. In this way, the benefits 
come within the scope of Art. 15 of the OECD Model, which, in this sce-
nario, refers to “benefits” from an employment and not “wages” (plenary 
session of 3 September 2008). Thus, Art. 15 allocates the taxation right 
over this income to the work state. The fact that in effectuating this taxa-
tion right the Netherlands subsequently taxes the income as income 
from other activities does not, according to the position of the State 
Secretary taken during the plenary session of 3 September 2008, make 
any difference. It seems that this extract of the plenary session of 3 Sep-
tember 2008 explicitly concerns the distinction between income from 
employment (Art. 15 OECD Model) and capital gains (Art. 13 OECD 
Model). However, the parliamentary question only refers to “capital 
gains”. The answer to this question employs the more neutral expres-
sion “capital benefits”. Annex 1 to the letter of the State Secretary of 
Finance of 24 June 2011 to the Chairman of the Second Chamber of the 
States-General, p. 16 indicated that the carried interest is also intended 
to remunerate activities. If these activities are carried on in the course 
of employment or as a director, the carried interest has to be classified 
under Arts. 15 or 16 of the OECD Model. Again, this statement does 
not devote attention to the question of whether the connection with the 
employment suffices in order to regard the carried interest as wages or 
directors’ fees at the moment it is treated as income from lucrative inter-
est under the ITA 2001. 
18. Explanatory Memorandum (MvA), Kamerstukken I, 2008/09, 31 359, 
No. C, pp. 17 and 18.
19. Explanatory Memorandum (MvA), Kamerstukken I, 2008/09, 31 359, 
No. C, p. 18. According to the State Secretary, a dividend that is paid by 
a company resident in the Netherlands to a non-resident taxpayer who 
holds a lucrative interest has to be classified under Art. 10 of the tax 
treaty if the treaty follows the OECD Model.
20. Report on consultation in writing, Kamerstukken I, 2008/09, 31 459, No. 
E (Letter from the State Secretary of Finance to the Chairman of the First 
Chamber of the States-General of 5 December 2008), pp. 8 and 9. It is 
useful to note that Art. 10 of the OECD Model is only applicable when 
the limited partnership is an entity residing in the United States; see, in 
regard to these aspects of the dividend article, J.F. Avery Jones et al., “The 
Definitions of Dividends and Interest: Something Lost in Translation”, 
World Tax Journal 1 (2009), p. 5 et seq. 
21. Supreme Court, 5 September 2003, BNB 2003/379 and 381. See, for a 
short discussion of these decisions, F.P.G. Pötgens, “The Relationship 
between Preservative Tax Assessments and Netherlands Tax Treaties: 
Not Always Pacta Sunt Servanda?”, European Taxation 5 (2010), p. 186.
22. Supreme Court, 21 February 2003, BNB 2003/177 and 178.
23. Supreme Court, 10 February 1999, BNB 1999/153.
24. Occupational Disability Insurance Act (Wet op de Arbeidsongeschikt-
heidsverzekeringen, WAO) and General Disability Insurance Act 
(Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet, AAW). The AAW has been 
abolished as of 1 January 1998 and the WAO has been replaced by The 
Law on Work and Income according to Working Ability (Wet Werk en 
Inkomen naar Arbeidsvermogen, WIA) as of 1 January 2006.
25. In its decision of 27 September 2000, BNB 2001/29, the Supreme Court 
held that a WAO allowance under the Tax Regulation for the Kingdom 
(Belastingregeling voor het Koninkrijk, BRK) – which does not contain 
a specific social security provision – fell under the other income article 
despite the fact that, under domestic law, a WAO allowance has to 
be considered wages from former employment (Art. 11(1)(e) WTA). 
Apparently, the Supreme Court considers, although it did not make 
this entirely clear, that, in this case, the context requires a meaning 
that deviates from the meaning under domestic law. As a consequence, 
the public disability allowance did not fall within the income from 
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concluded before the WTA containing such fictions was 
enacted (before 1 January 1997).26
An explicit choice has been made in the national legis-
lation to tax benefits from a lucrative interest as income 
from other activities. The regime for income from 
employment (Art. 3.80 of the ITA 2001, in conjunction 
with Art. 10(1) WTA) is then either no longer applica-
ble or was never applicable at all, for example, because 
there was no employment relationship. In any event, the 
specific rules of Art. 3.92b of the ITA 2001 that provide 
for the taxation of income from a lucrative interest only 
come into play when the situation falls outside the sphere 
of wages taxation.27 What is certain, however, is that, 
under domestic law, there cannot be said to be wages so 
that it is difficult to see how, by means of Art. 3(2) of the 
OECD Model, the position can be taken that the income 
falls under Art. 15 of the OECD Model (or Art. 16, which 
in this event has to be viewed as lex specialis with respect 
to Art. 15). The context does not play a role here at all. 
After all, under domestic law, there cannot be said to be 
wages.28
The State Secretary does not exactly clarify how he arrived 
at the opinion that Art. 15 (or Art. 16) of the OECD 
Model can be applied to benefits from a lucrative inter-
est based on the hypothesis that they will be considered 
income from other activities under domestic law and thus 
will not be taxed (and will no longer be taxed) as income 
from employment. In the plenary session of 2 September 
2008– in support of his position – he pointed to the fact 
that Art. 15 of the OECD Model refers to “benefits” and 
not “wages” and, as such, income from a lucrative interest 
would also fall under Art. 15 of the OECD Model. This is 
where the crux of the analysis lies. Art. 15 of the OECD 
Model uses the concept “salaries, wages and other similar 
remuneration” and not the more neutral concept of “ben-
efits”. “Salaries, wages and other similar remuneration” is 
a concept with a legal connotation, which is not defined 
in the treaty and which, hence, must be interpreted with 
the help of Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model. In this event, 
the meaning that the concept has under domestic law 
must be examined. The consequence is, thus, that the 
benefits from a lucrative interest cannot be classified 
under Art. 15 of the OECD Model. No further problems 
of delimitation occur because it is clear that other distrib-
utive provisions of the OECD Model apply depending on 
the civil law form of the relevant benefits (see 6.).
5.2.  Decisions with regard to fictitious income
Even if one accepts the State Secretary’s view that ben-
efits from a lucrative interest may fall under Arts. 15 or 
Art. 16 of the OECD Model and that, for purposes of the 
tax treaty, they may be considered to be salary, it has not 
yet been established that this classification holds for all 
tax treaties concluded by the Netherlands. On the basis 
of the Supreme Court case law this only holds true for 
tax treaties that were concluded after 1 January 2009.29 
After all, the fiction in Art. 3.92b of the ITA 2001 results 
in a potential displacement of the allocation of taxation 
rights. This is because, as a result of a post-treaty change 
in the domestic law, income that normally flows to the 
taxpayer as dividends, interest or capital gains (and falls 
under Arts. 10, 11 or 13 of the OECD Model – see also 
6.) will be classified under a different allocation provi-
sion (Arts. 15 and 16 of the OECD Model) with the result 
that the Netherlands potentially will have broader taxa-
tion rights than under the first-mentioned provisions. 
Application of such a domestic law fiction to a tax treaty 
concluded earlier is prevented by the context of Art. 3(2) 
of the OECD Model,30 i.e. the requirement of the Nether-
lands to exercise good faith in the interpretation and ap-
plication of a tax treaty (compare Arts. 26 and 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention).31 This entails that the classification 
26. In its decisions of 5 September 2003, BNB 2003/379 and 381, the 
Supreme Court held that Art. 15 (dependent personal services) and Art. 
16 (directors’ fees) of the former Netherlands–Belgium tax treaty (1970) 
were not applicable to fictitious wages (Art. 12a WTA) because the 
context within the meaning of Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model prevented 
application of Art. 12a of the WTA under that treaty. The Supreme 
Court seemed to accept that the fictitious wages were considered to be 
“salaries, wages and other similar remuneration derived by” within the 
meaning of Art. 15(1) of that treaty.
27. Explanatory Memorandum (MvT), Kamerstukken II, 2007/08, 31 
459, No. 3, pp. 8 and 17, as well as Explanatory Memorandum (MvA), 
Kamerstukken I, 2007/08, 31 459, No. C, p. 10. See also S.A. Stevens, 
“Belastingheffing van lucratieve belangen: een excessieve en onduidelijke 
heffing”, Maandblad Belastingbeschouwingen 1 (2009), p. 24 and M.F.D. 
Schul, “De excessieve aanpak van beloningsbestanddelen”, Weekblad 
fiscaal recht 6801 (2009), p. 264 et seq., section 7.
28. A different approach is followed by P. Kavelaars, “Arbeidsinkomsten en 
verdragsbeleid,” Maandblad Belastingbeschouwingen 4 (2011), p. 170. 
According to this author, income from a lucrative interest continues 
to be wages for wage tax purposes although it is characterized as 
income from other activities for income tax purposes. This difference 
is, according to Kavelaars, due to the rule on the order of sources that 
is included in the ITA 2001. However, as mentioned above, taxation as 
income from a lucrative interest presupposes that the sphere of wages has 
been left behind with the result that the connection with employment 
is too remote for the interest to be treated as wages. Moreover, for the 
tax treaty classification of the income the characterization for income 
tax purposes prevails over that under wage tax, i.e. a withholding tax 
that is ultimately credited against the income tax due. Compare the 
decision of the Supreme Court of 12 December 2003, BNB 2004/123. 
The classification of a repurchase of a company’s own shares for income 
tax purposes (alienation) was decisive at the tax treaty level and prevailed 
over the different characterization thereof under the dividend withhold-
ing tax (dividend), inter alia, because the dividend withholding tax was 
ultimately credited against the income tax. 
29. Supreme Court, 5 September 2003, BNB 2003/379 and 381 (fictitious 
wages) and 18 June 2004, BNB 2004/134 (fictitious interest). 
30. On the basis of the Netherlands Supreme Court´s decisions in BNB 
2003/379 and 381 one can assume that if the other contracting state 
has a measure in its national legislation comparable to the Netherlands 
taxation of benefits from lucrative interests (the principle of reciproc-
ity or reciprocity of legislation) the classification preferred by the State 
Secretary of Finance, i.e. classification under Arts. 15 or 16 of the OECD 
Model, can be followed. In its decision of 19 June 2009, BNB 2009/264 
(a lump-sum payment of an annuity received after the annuity holder’s 
emigration from the Netherlands to Belgium) the Netherlands Supreme 
Courts nuances the principle of reciprocity. A tax treaty-frustrating 
deeming provision (which effect is also recognized by the Belgian case 
law), included in the domestic legislation of a contracting state (Belgium; 
Art. 364bis of the Belgium Income Taxes Code) after the conclusion 
of a relevant tax treaty (the former Netherlands–Belgium tax treaty 
(1970)) cannot justify a comparable fiction having effect at the tax 
treaty level if it was included in the Netherlands legislation after the 
conclusion of the tax treaty in question. See also Pötgens, note 21, p. 
189 and E.C.C.M. Kemmeren, “Exitheffing bij pensioenen: Financiën is 
hardleers”, Weekblad fiscal recht 6820 (2009), p. 881 et seq., section 7.
31. The Netherlands Supreme Court mentioned Art. 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention in its decision of 5 September 2003, BNB 2003/380, which 
dealt with surrender of a pension by a resident of Singapore. The 
pension was built up in a Netherlands pension fund and on the basis 
of employment with a Netherlands BV that had partly been carried out
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of benefits from a lucrative interest must not apply to tax 
treaties concluded before 1 January 2009.32
5.3.  Conditions for the applicability of Art. 15 OECD 
Model
For tax treaties concluded after 1 January 2009, if the 
hypothesis of the State Secretary is correct, i.e. that Arts. 
15 and Art. 16 of the OECD Model can be applied to 
benefits from a lucrative interest, it has to be determined 
first whether or not one of the conditions in Art. 15(2) 
of the OECD Model has not been fulfilled before allo-
cating the taxation right to the state of employment, as 
well as whether the conditions of Art. 16 of the OECD 
Model have been fulfilled. In particular, the condition in 
Art. 15(2)(b) of the OECD Model may be of relevance in 
this respect.
Assuming that the benefits from a lucrative interest are 
allocated by a non-resident private equity firm to a fund 
manager who is not resident in the Netherlands (both the 
private equity firm and the fund manager are resident in 
state X with which the Netherlands has concluded a tax 
treaty that follows the OECD Model). The benefits from 
the lucrative interest also cover activities that the fund 
manager carried out for a Netherlands resident target 
company. The fund manager is subject to non-resident 
tax liability for the entire benefit that he receives from 
the lucrative interest under Art. 7.2(2)(c) in conjunction 
with Art. 7.2(3) of the ITA 2001 (see also 3.). Assum-
ing that the viewpoint of the State Secretary can be fol-
lowed, i.e. that this benefit does fall under Art. 15 of the 
applicable tax treaty, the Netherlands, as the employment 
state has, in principle, taxation rights over that part of the 
benefit that can be allocated to the employment carried 
out in the Netherlands. The allocation of remuneration 
to employment carried out in the Netherlands is gener-
ally made on the basis of a days-based fraction as per a 
decision of the Supreme Court.33 The days-based frac-
tion and the time-proportionate allocation set out in the 
decision is not applied if the benefit specifically involves 
activities that were carried out for the Netherlands target 
company and are not, at the same time, aimed at remu-
nerating the activities that were carried out, for example, 
for the private equity firm in State X.34 This will, presum-
ably, often occur in situations that are comparable to the 
one in the example.35
Moreover, assuming that the conditions of Art. 15(2)(a) 
and (c) of the OECD Model are fulfilled, it has to be exam-
ined whether or not the Netherlands target company can 
be considered an employer who pays remuneration or 
on whose behalf remuneration is paid. The Netherlands 
target company may be considered to be an employer 
within the meaning of Art. 15 of Netherlands tax treaties 
that follow the OECD Model if it is a formal employer, i.e. 
if the fund manager entered into a formal employment 
contract with the Netherlands resident target company. 
If the target company is not a formal employer, it may 
be considered an employer within the meaning of Art. 
15(2)(b) of the relevant tax treaty. In this instance, it 
must satisfy the conditions that the Supreme Court laid 
down in its decisions of 1 December 2006,36 in which the 
Court advocates a material or substantive interpretation 
of the concept of “employer” for purposes of Art. 15 of 
Netherlands tax treaties that are patterned on the OECD 
Model, which lead to the determination of a “de facto” 
employer.37 The target company is regarded as a ‘de facto’ 
employer if the following conditions are met:
 in the Netherlands. Art. 19b(1)(b) of the WTA, which was introduced 
after the conclusion of the Netherlands–Singapore tax treaty, provided 
that a surrender of a pension leads to a reclassification of the fair market 
value of the pension entitlement as wages from previous employment 
deemed to have been enjoyed at a time immediately preceding the sur-
render. The good faith to be observed in the interpretation of Art. 18(1) 
of the Netherlands–Singapore tax treaty (1971) (which allocated the 
taxation rights over the amount of the surrender of a pension exclusively 
to Singapore) entailed that the fiction of Art. 19b(1)(b) of the WTA is 
in conflict with the interpretation of Art. 18(1) of that treaty since ap-
plication of the fiction in Art. 19b(1)(b) of the WTA to that treaty would 
mean that the amount of the surrender would be classified under Art. 
15, with the result that the Netherlands would gain taxation rights at 
the expense of Singapore. See also Supreme Court, 19 June 2009, BNB 
2009/263, 265 and 266 (preservative tax assessment imposed pursuant 
to Art. 2.8(2) in conjunction with Art. 3.83(1) of the ITA 2001 on the 
emigration of a pensioner to France, Korea and the Philippines, respec-
tively) and Supreme Court, 19 June 2009, BNB 2009/264 (surrender of 
a tax-privileged annuity by the party entitled to the annuity who had 
emigrated earlier to Belgium in connection with which the value of the 
entitlement was taxed as a negative expense for income provision under 
Art. 3.133 in conjunction with Art. 3.137 of the ITA 2001, i.e. the market 
value of the previously paid and deducted premiums was taxed at that 
time); the Supreme Court was of the opinion that this was not in con-
formity with the good faith to be observed in the interpretation of Art. 
18 of the treaty with France, Art. 19 of the treaty with Korea and Art. 18 
of the treaty with the Philippines (pensions), or Art. 22 (other income 
article) of the former tax treaty with Belgium. See, for a discussion of 
these decisions of the Netherlands Supreme Court, Pötgens, note 21, p. 
183 et seq. In its decision of 15 April 2011, BNB 2011/160, the Supreme 
Court held that a preservative assessment imposed on the emigration of 
a pensioner to Belgium did not contravene the good faith that had to be 
observed when interpreting and applying Art. 18 of the Netherlands–
Belgium tax treaty (2001) because this provision assigns the taxation 
right to the source state (the Netherlands) in many cases. This may only 
be different if the Netherlands does not have the authority under Art. 18 
of that treaty to tax an irregular transaction as regards a pension arising 
after the emigration, for example, a lump sum that would normally lead 
to collection of a preservative assessment. It is striking that the Supreme 
Court found it irrelevant in this respect that the Belgium–Netherlands 
tax treaty entered into force on 1 January 2003 (after the inclusion of 
the preservative assessments into the Netherlands ITA 2001) and that 
Belgium was aware of the system of preservative assessments imposed 
on pensioners emigrating to Belgium (which followed from the joint 
explanatory memorandum). According to the Supreme Court, these 
elements may not prejudice the taxpayer’s interests. 
32. On the same lines see Stevens, note 27, p. 24; Schul, note 27, section 
7 and R. M. Freudenthal and E.P.H.G. Raaijmakers, “Belastingheffing 
over lucratieve belangen: veel hagel en weinig mug…,” Weekblad fiscaal 
recht 6791 (2008), p. 1373. See, however, the decision of the Netherlands 
Supreme Court of 15 April 2011, note 31.
33. Supreme Court, 23 September 2005, BNB 2006/52.
34. See F.P.G. Pötgens, Income from International Private Employment, 
Doctoral Series No. 12 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006), pp. 370 and 371 for 
further examples of income components that are specifically allocable 
to an employment exercised in the work state.
35. In examining the parliamentary history, it is apparent that the 
description of the allocation is ambiguous. The Report on written 
consultations, Kamerstukken I, 2008/09, 31 459, No. E (letter of the 
State Secretary of Finance to the Chairman of the First Chamber of the 
States-General of 5 December 2008), pp. 8 and 9, allocates the benefits 
from a lucrative interest entirely to the activities that are carried out 
abroad prior to emigration to the Netherlands, but it should be noted 
that, in the example, no activities were carried out in the Netherlands. 
Stevens, note 27, p. 23 infers somewhat cautiously, on the basis of the 
Explanatory Memorandum (MvA), Kamerstukken I, 2008/09, 31 459, 
No. C, p. 17, that an allocation proportional to time must be made.
36. Supreme Court, 1 December 2006, BNB 2006/75 through 79.
37. The Decree of the State Secretary of Finance of 12 January 2010, BNB 
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(1) Subordinate relationship: did the target company 
have the authority to give instructions, meaning that 
the fund manager was obliged to follow its concrete 
directions during his work activities in the work state 
(the Netherlands)?
(2) Are the costs of the work activities of the fund 
manager borne by the target company and are the 
advantages of that work for the account of the fund 
manager and the risks and disadvantages resulting 
from that work for the account of the target 
company?
(3) Is the target company responsible for the results of 
the work of the fund manager?
(4) Is the salary of the fund manger recharged, on an 
individually identifiable basis, by the private equity 
firm in State X to the target company?
In particular, the elements under (1) and (4) will often be 
crucial. After all, with regard to (1) it is conceivable that 
the private equity fund manager will not work under the 
authority of the target company and that it would also not 
have the authority to give him instructions. The authority 
over the work the fund manager performs for the target 
company is exercised by the private equity firm resident 
in State X and, therefore, the condition of Art. 15(2)(b) 
of the tax treaty with State X (which follows the OECD 
Model) has been fulfilled and the treaty thus restricts the 
Netherlands in exercising its national taxation rights.
With regard to (4) duplication can be seen with the 
requirement that the wages must be “paid by or on behalf 
of”. Hence, it is unclear why, in its decisions of 1 Decem-
ber 2006, the Supreme Court looked at whether the tax 
was recharged on an individually identifiable basis in 
answering the question whether or not there was an em-
ployer and why the Court did not take into account the 
recharge under the “paid by or on behalf of” require-
ment.38 It should be noted here that, in its decision of 19 
June 1996,39 the Supreme Court held that remuneration is 
paid on behalf of the target company (in the case at hand), 
if the private equity firm specifically passes on the rele-
vant remuneration (in other words, on an individually 
identifiable basis) to the target company. In its decision 
of 23 June 2006,40 the Supreme Court again emphasized 
the importance of an individually identifiable recharge 
in connection with which it considered an allocation of 
the costs of a severance payment under the arm’s length 
principle of Art. 9 of the OECD Model to be insufficient. 
Generally, when granting shares and similar benefits con-
stituting lucrative interests there is no party involved that 
bears the costs in connection with the grant (the grant of 
a lucrative interest will lead, at most, to dilution of the 
interests of other shareholders, a circumstance that is not 
suitable for a cost recharge). Given the nature of grant-
ing these types of benefits, there will not, generally, be 
an individually identifiable recharge. Therefore, for this 
reason as well, the requirement of Art. 15(2)(b) of the rel-
evant tax treaty will be met. As a consequence, under that 
treaty, the Netherlands does not have any taxation rights.
5.4.  Conditions for application of Art. 16 OECD 
Model
The above example can be adapted somewhat to circum-
stances where the fund manager is the director of the 
Netherlands resident target company. In interpreting 
“director” under Art. 16 of the tax treaty, the Supreme 
Court takes a formal approach; there is a director in the 
above sense when the person in question is a member 
of the board of directors.41 It is important to emphasize 
that, according to the Supreme Court, there is a direc-
tor’s fee within the meaning of Art. 16 of the treaty only 
if the remuneration at issue is recharged, on an individu-
ally identifiable basis, or is borne on such a basis by the 
company for whom the directorship is carried out (See 
the 15 July 1997 Supreme Court decision, which dealt 
with a Netherlands resident target company. Here, the 
Supreme Court mentions the “paid by or on behalf of” 
requirement in order to determine whether or not there 
was a sufficient relationship between the remuneration 
and the work that the relevant taxpayer carried out as 
director for it to be considered a director’s fee).42 See also 
the Supreme Court decision of 11 June 2004, wherein 
the Court determined that a severance payment may, 
according to the Supreme Court, only be seen as a direc-
tor’s fee within the meaning of Art. 16(2) of the former 
Netherlands-Belgium tax treaty if, and to the extent that, 
it is borne on an individually identifiable basis by the 
company of which the relevant person was the director.43 
The Supreme Court repeated and confirmed this posi-
tion in its 1 December 2006 decision.44 In ground 3.3. it 
held that, with regard to the applicability of Art. 16 of the 
former Netherlands-Belgium tax treaty:
Article 16 § 2 of the Treaty is – to the extent relevant – applica-
ble to the fee received by a resident of the Netherlands who is a 
member of the board of directors of an NV/SA resident in Bel-
gium. ‘Fee’ in this respect means: fee that is paid to the director 
for the work done in the capacity as director that as such is paid 
by or on behalf of the NV/SA (compare HR 15 July 1997, No. 
32 016, BNB 1997/298). The claim, which is based on a different 
view, can thus not be upheld. (author’s translation)
 Netherlands tax treaties patterned on Art. 15(2)(b) of the OECD Model. 
The Decree provides, inter alia, a practical rule for assignments within 
a group of companies. For example, the recipient Netherlands resident 
group company is not regarded as an employer for tax treaty purposes 
provided that the employee is not employed in the Netherlands for a 
period exceeding 60 work days during a 12-month period. This 60-days 
regulation is also included in Ministry of Finance, Memorandum on 
Netherlands Tax Treaty Policy 2011/Ministerie van Financiën, Notitie 
Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid 2011, Para. 2.10; see also Kavelaars, note 28, pp. 
168 and 169. See, for a discussion of BNB 2010/110, J.P. van ´t Hof and 
M.R.M. Deden, “Het begrip ‘werkgever’ volgens art. 15 OESO-Model-
verdrag nader toegelicht”, Weekblad fiscaal recht 6868 (2010), p. 971 et 
seq. and R. Oldenhuis, “De 60-dagenregeling nagenoeg geheel nutteloos. 
De wet biedt een alternatief!”, Weekblad fiscaal recht 6863 (2010), p. 819 
et seq.
38. F.P.G. Pötgens, “De Hoge Raad bevestigt en verduidelijkt het materiële 
werkgeverschap onder de belastingverdragen”, Weekblad fiscaal recht 
6714 (2007), p. 375, section 3.3.
39. Supreme Court, 19 June 1996, BNB 1996/369.
40. Supreme Court, 23 June 2006, BNB 2006/295.
41. Supreme Court, 22 December 1999, BNB 2000/94 and 10 December 
2004, BNB 2005/195.
42. Supreme Court, 15 July 1997, BNB 1997/298.
43. Supreme Court, 11 June 2004, BNB 2004/344.
44. Supreme Court, 1 December 2006, BNB 2007/77.
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This means that the remarks made with respect to Art. 
15(2)(b) of the tax treaty in 5.4. are, mutatis mutandis, 
applicable to Art. 16 of the OECD Model. As a result, if 
the remuneration cannot be recharged on an individu-
ally identifiable basis by the private equity firm to the 
target company, there cannot be said to be a director’s fee 
within the meaning of Art. 16 of the applicable tax treaty; 
hence the Netherlands does not have the right to tax.
6.  Classification of Benefits from a Lucrative 
Interest under Art. 10 (Dividends), Art. 11 
(Interest) and Art. 13 (Capital Gains) of the 
OECD Model
Since the benefits from a lucrative interest do not fall 
under Arts. 15 or 16 of the OECD Model the ques-
tion arises how they should be classified. In the author’s 
opinion, the civil law form under which the benefits are 
enjoyed ultimately determines which treaty article is 
applicable, in other words Art. 10 (dividends), Art. 11 
(interest) or Art. 13 (capital gains) of the OECD Model. 
This can be explained in more detail as follows.
Classification as business profits under Art. 7 of the 
OECD Model. In this regard, Art. 3(1)(h) of the OECD 
Model provides that the concept of “business” includes, 
“the performance of professional services and other activ-
ities of an independent character” and Art. 3(1)(c) estab-
lishes that the concept of “enterprise” entails “the carry-
ing on of any business”. Any income from other activities 
can also be subsumed under this article,45 including ben-
efits from a lucrative interest. Assuming the benefits are 
classified as falling under Art. 7 of the OECD Model, Art. 
7(7) will also have to be taken into account. Art. 7(7) of 
the OECD Model provides that where profits include 
items of income that are dealt with separately in other 
articles of the tax treaty, the other provision takes prior-
ity. Depending on the nature of the income received or 
realized, Art. 10 (dividends), Art. 11 (interest) or Art. 13 
(capital gains) of the OECD Model are applicable and 
these, as a matter of principle, prevail over Art. 7 of the 
OECD Model. Art. 10(4) (dividends), Art. 11(4) (interest) 
and Art. 13(2) (capital gains) of the OECD Model have to 
be taken into account. However, these provisions assume 
that there is a permanent establishment (PE) and, as such, 
the underlying shareholding in respect of which the di-
vidends are paid, the debt claim in respect of which the 
interest is paid or the movable property that is alienated 
is effectively connected to the business assets of the PE. 
The conclusion is thus that, given the assumption that, 
in the sphere of a lucrative interest, it is not likely that 
a PE has been constituted, the benefits from a lucrative 
interest (depending on the form in which these benefits 
are enjoyed or realized) have to be classified under Arts. 
10, 11 or 13 of the OECD Model. This is also in line with 
the nature of the income and thereby with the structure 
of the OECD Model.
7.  Conclusion
With respect to the tax treaty classification of 
benefits from a lucrative interest, the author’s view 
differs from that of the State Secretary of Finance. 
Contrary to the State Secretary’s view, the author 
established that benefits from a lucrative interest 
do not fall under Arts. 15 and 16 of Netherlands tax 
treaties that follow the OECD Model. According 
to the author, this follows from a consistent 
application of Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model, which 
refers, for the meaning of undefined terms, to the 
domestic law of the states applying the tax treaty. 
By virtue of the Netherlands domestic law, benefits 
from a lucrative interest are only taxed as income 
from other activities if they do not fall under 
the tax regime for income from employment. If 
this is the case, they no longer constitute income 
from employment. Because of the reference to the 
domestic law in Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model, these 
benefits are also not wages within the meaning of 
Arts. 15 and 16 of the OECD Model and, as such, 
these provisions are not applicable. Instead, the 
benefits from a lucrative interest, depending on the 
nature of the underlying capital components, as a 
rule, have to be classified under Arts. 10, 11 or 13 of 
the OECD Model.
Even if the State Secretary’s viewpoint as regards 
the applicability of Arts. 15 and 16 of the OECD 
Model were to be endorsed, the conditions imposed 
on the allocation of the taxation rights to the 
Netherlands would often not be satisfied in regard 
to non-resident taxpayers of the Netherlands. This 
is, in particular, the situation with respect to the 
individually identifiable recharge criterion. 
In addition, regarding tax treaties concluded 
before 1 January 2009, in examining the context, as 
required by Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model, including 
the Supreme Court decisions regarding fictitious 
wages and fictitious interest, it is evident that the 
Netherlands would be restricted in taxing benefits 
from lucrative interests enjoyed by non-resident 
taxpayers.
45. See A.C.G.A.C. de Graaf, P. Kavelaars and A.J.A. Stevens, Internatio-
naal Belastingrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 2010), pp. 149 and 150, as well as 
Pötgens, note 34, p. 287.
